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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
When a defendant is charged with false reporting based 
on an ambiguous reporting requirement, what is the prosecu-
tion’s burden at trial as to the element of falsity?  Is it sufficient 
for the prosecution to prove the statement was false only under 
the Government’s interpretation of the requirement, or must it 
prove the statement was false under each objectively reasona-
ble interpretation of the requirement?  In the balance hang the 
convictions of four former executives of Wilmington Trust 
Corporation, a bank that, in the wake of the Great Recession of 
2008, excluded certain commercial real estate loans from those 
it reported as “past due” to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and the Federal Reserve.  The executives maintained 
that, under a reasonable interpretation of these requirements, 
the exclusion of the loans was proper, but the District Court 
denied their requests to introduce evidence concerning or in-
struct the jury about that alternative interpretation.  The jury 
then found the executives’ reporting constituted “false state-
ments” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, 15 U.S.C. § 78m, and 
related statutes and convicted Defendants on all counts.   
We hold today that to prove falsity beyond a reasonable 
doubt in this situation, the Government must prove either that 
its interpretation of the reporting requirement is the only objec-
tively reasonable interpretation or that the defendant’s state-
ment was also false under the alternative, objectively reasona-
ble interpretation.  And because the Government here pro-
duced insufficient evidence from which a rational jury could 
find Defendants’ statements false under this rule, we will re-
verse Defendants’ false statements convictions and remand on 
those counts for entry of judgments of acquittal.  As for De-
fendants’ conspiracy and securities fraud convictions, 
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however, which were charged in the alternative on an inde-
pendent theory of liability, we will vacate and remand for re-
trial. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. The Bank’s Internal Practices 
For many years before the Great Recession, Wilming-
ton Trust maintained a significant commercial real estate lend-
ing practice.  This department responsible for this practice is-
sued “term loans,” meaning the borrower would make monthly 
interest payments and repay the principal sum at “maturity,” 
i.e., the date “set forth in the promissory note and the loan 
agreement.”  A5977–78; see, e.g., A11755 (requiring “pay-
ment of all outstanding principal plus all accrued unpaid inter-
est” on the date of maturity as well as “regularly monthly pay-
ments of all accrued unpaid interest” on a monthly basis).  Be-
cause the loans typically financed construction projects, those 
terms were short—two or three years—and, upon their expira-
tion, the loans could be repaid, extended, or refinanced.  
A3040.  Extensions were commonplace in this context, and the 
Bank’s loan documents reserved its right to “renew or extend 
(repeatedly and for any length of time) this loan . . . without the 
consent of or notice to anyone.”  A11756.   
For purposes of its internal classification of such loans, 
the Bank did not classify all mature loans with unpaid princi-
pals as past due.  Instead—so long as loans were in the process 
of renewal and interest payments were current—the Bank did 
not classify those loans as “past due,” even if the maturity date 
had passed.  This treatment of the loans internally was known 
as a “waiver practice.”     
Through most of Wilmington Trust’s history, the 
waiver practice had been a relatively minor feature of the 
Bank’s portfolio.  But this changed dramatically in 2009.  By 
that point, the Bank had taken on an increasing number of com-
mercial real estate loans, many with maturity dates around the 
same time.  When borrowers on these loans were unable to re-
pay their principals with the advent of the Great Recession, the 
volume of mature loans without full principal repayment ex-
ploded, ballooning to $303.6 million in total by year-end 2009.  
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The effect on the Bank’s reporting was commensurate:  As the 
Bank applied its pre-existing waiver practice to many of these 
loans, the discrepancy between matured, non-repaid loans and 
Bank-defined “past due” loans ballooned as well.  See A5359–
65, A7740 ($8.5 million reported, $296.6 million in all). 
The Bank reacted to this unprecedented volume in sev-
eral ways.  First, it approved mass extensions of loans that had 
matured or were nearing maturity.  Second, for reasons not en-
tirely clear, in July 2010 the Bank changed its waiver practice, 
resolving that “[a]ll matured/current loans” would be “reported 
in [the] Past Due numbers.”  A11044.  Ultimately, however, 
the Bank was unable to weather the financial crisis unscathed.  
By the third quarter of 2010, a substantial number of loans were 
past due or placed on nonaccrual; the Federal Reserve issued a 
“troubled condition” letter, A3528; and by November 2010 the 
Bank had merged with M&T Bank.   
B. Wilmington Trust’s Regulatory Oversight  
Wilmington Trust’s internal classification of its loans 
also carried over to its external reporting of loans so that, when 
required to report “past due” loans, it excluded the “waived” 
loans, which it treated as current.  As a federally insured bank 
and a publicly traded company, Wilmington Trust reported to, 
as relevant here, three regulators: the SEC, the Fed, and the 
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), an agency within the De-
partment of the Treasury that has since merged with the Office 
of the Comptroller.1  Each of these regulators required the 
Bank to report “past due” loans and, while none gave a defini-
tion, each described the reporting requirement in slightly dif-
ferent terms.  
The SEC, in its “Industry Guide” for bank holding com-
panies, instructed the Bank to identify “[a]ccruing loans which 
are contractually past due 90 days or more as to principal or 
interest payments.”  A9219 (emphasis added); see also 17 
C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1) instruction 13 (directing “bank holding 
companies” to the “information called for in Guide 3” when 
 
1 Defendants were not charged with making false state-
ments to the OTS.   
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preparing quarterly and annual reports).  The SEC provided no 
further guidance on the meaning of “past due.” 
The Fed, in its instructions to banks submitting quar-
terly “call reports,” also used the word “contractual” to define 
“past due loans”:  It required the Bank to report “all loans . . . 
that are past due,” with “[t]he past due status of a loan . . . de-
termined in accordance with its contractual repayment terms.”  
A9622.  The Fed’s instructions (the “call report instructions”) 
then went further, stating that “grace periods allowed by the 
bank after a loan . . . has become past due but before the impo-
sition of late charges are not to be taken into account,” id., and 
clarifying, in relevant part, that loans “are to be reported as past 
due when either interest or principal is unpaid in the following 
circumstances”: 
(3) Single payment and demand notes, debt se-
curities, and other assets providing for the pay-
ment of interest at stated intervals are to be re-
ported as past due after one interest payment is 
due and unpaid for 30 days or more. 
(4) Single payment notes, debt securities, and 
other assets providing for the payment of interest 
at maturity are to be reported as past due after 
maturity if interest or principal remains unpaid 
for 30 days or more. 
A9622–23.   
The Bank’s third regulator, OTS, also provided an “in-
struction manual” directing Wilmington Trust to “[r]eport all 
loans . . . that are contractually past due” and, much like those 
from the Federal Reserve, specifying that “grace periods” 
should not be “take[n] . . . into account when determining past 
due status.”  A12399.  OTS also tracked the language of the 
Fed’s “Circumstance 3” and “Circumstance 4” to describe its 
requirement, instructing that loans should be reported “as past 
due when either interest or principal is unpaid in the following 
circumstances”: 
c) Single payment and demand notes providing 
for the payment of interest at stated intervals 
(such as certain construction loans) after one 
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interest payment is due and unpaid for 30 days or 
more. 
d) Single payment notes providing for the pay-
ment of interest at maturity if interest or principal 
remains unpaid for 30 days or more after ma-
turity. 
Id. (emphasis omitted).   
Unlike the Fed, however, OTS provided further guid-
ance as to the meaning of these circumstances in the form of 
Q&As on its website.  Importantly for our purposes, one such 
question asked about a situation—akin to the Bank’s waiver 
practice—where “construction loans that require interest-only 
payments due monthly with the principal due at maturity” were 
past maturity but current on interest.  A12509.  The response 
posted by OTS was that: 
If management has restructured or extended a 
loan—formally or informally[—]then the loan 
would not be past due.  An informal extension 
(not the same as a restructuring) is when the bank 
has agreed to accept interest payments until the 
property is rented or sold.  The extension should 
be for a limited and reasonable length of time[,] 
and the bank should get the extension in writing.  
From the borrower’s perspective, if he is doing 
what the bank has told him, the loan is not in de-
fault and does not have to be reported . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added).  
All parties agree that apart from these sources, there are 
no statutory or regulatory definitions illuminating the defini-
tion of “past due” or explaining how that term should be ap-
plied to term loans past maturity but current on interest.   
C. Procedural History  
In August 2016, a grand jury returned a Third Supersed-
ing Indictment (the Indictment) charging Gibson, Harra, North, 
Rakowski, and the Bank with conspiracy to defraud the United 
States, commit securities fraud, and make false statements to 
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regulators in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count One); secu-
rities fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (Count Two); 
making false statements to the SEC and Federal Reserve in vi-
olation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and 15 U.S.C. § 78m (Counts 
Three through Sixteen); and falsely certifying financial reports 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (Counts Seventeen through 
Nineteen, as to Gibson only).2  Every offense with which De-
fendants were charged involved the alleged falsity of the 
Bank’s reporting of “past due” loans.3  As the Government puts 
it, the “starting point” for each charge “[wa]s that Defendants 
knew that the . . . past due loan statements were false” but 
nonetheless made them with the requisite criminal intent.  Ap-
pellee’s Br. 123.   
The Government separately contends that the mass ex-
tensions mentioned above formed an alternate basis for liabil-
ity for the conspiracy and securities fraud counts, independent 
of any false statements.  Under this “extend and pretend” 
scheme, the Government charged the Defendants with extend-
ing the maturity date of soon-to-come-due loans without ade-
quate investigation or underwriting, in order to hide the scope 
of the Bank’s past due loan liability from investors. 
For their part, Defendants advanced a theory throughout 
the trial that their statements were not actually false because 
the SEC’s and Federal Reserve’s reporting instructions were 
 
2  Count Three charges only the Bank, but the Bank was 
dismissed as a defendant before trial. 
 
 3 “To establish a violation of § 1001, the government 
[i]s required to prove each of the following five elements: 
(1) that [the accused] made a statement or representation; 
(2) that the statement or representation was false; (3) that the 
false statement was made knowingly and willfully; (4) that the 
statement or representation was material; and (5) that the state-
ment or representation was made in a matter within the juris-
diction of the federal government.”  United States v. Mo-
yer, 674 F.3d 192, 213 (3d Cir. 2012).  The conspiracy, secu-
rities fraud, and false certification charges proceeded on the 
theory that Defendants’ exclusion of the waived loans from 
those they reported as “past due,” amounted to a false state-
ment.   
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ambiguous and, under an objectively reasonable interpretation 
of those instructions, Defendants were not required to report 
the waived loans as “past due.”  The District Court’s first ruling 
relating to this theory came in response to the Government’s 
motion to exclude the OTS Q&A.  In ruling that the OTS Q&A 
could be introduced only with respect to Defendants’ affirma-
tive defense of good faith—relevant to scienter—but not with 
respect to the element of falsity, the District Court ruled that 
“the applicable reporting requirements [we]re [not] ambigu-
ous.”  A4.  And even if there were ambiguity in the definition 
of “past due,” the Court concluded, the interpretation presented 
in the OTS Q&A—that a loan that has been “informal[ly] ex-
ten[ded] . . . when the bank has agreed to accept interest pay-
ments until the property is rented or sold” is not “past due,” 
A12509—would not be “a reasonable interpretation” of the 
call report instructions because an “informal” extension would 
be akin to a “grace period,” which the instructions made clear 
could not be taken into account.  A6.  Accordingly, the Court 
ruled that insofar as the OTS Q&A had suggested that “a bank 
need not execute legal documents for the status of a loan to 
change for past due reporting documents,” OTS provided an 
unreasonable interpretation of the term “past due” that the jury 
should not consider relevant to the reporting requirement or the 
Government’s burden to prove falsity.  A6–7. 
The issue of how to determine whether the Bank’s “past 
due” reporting was false returned when it came time for jury 
instructions.  Defendants urged the District Court to instruct 
the jury that “[t]o prove that any statement was false, the gov-
ernment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the state-
ment was not true under any reasonable interpretation of the[] 
reporting standards,” regardless what “any defendant actually 
believed.”  A1251; accord A1228–29, A1262, A1277–78, 
A1300.  They also asked that the jury be instructed to consider 
the OTS Q&A when ascertaining the “reasonable interpreta-
tion[s]” of what “past due” meant.  See, e.g., A1278.     
The Court denied both requests.  Instead, the Court gave 
three falsity instructions.  In the first, it called the jury’s atten-
tion to the Fed’s call report instructions, emphasizing that a 
loan’s past due status “should be determined in accordance 
with its contractual repayment terms” excluding “grace peri-
ods,” A7624–25, and reading aloud to the jury the third and 
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fourth circumstances.  In the second, the Court called the jury’s 
attention to the SEC’s requirement to state “loans which are 
contractually past due . . . as to principal or interest payments.”  
A7627.  And in the third, the Court instructed the jury that “[a] 
statement . . . is false if it is untrue when made, and if the per-
son making the statement . . . or causing it to be made knew it 
was untrue at the time.”  A7646.  The Court did not instruct 
that the Government must prove falsity under any reasonable 
interpretation of “past due,” nor did it refer to the OTS Q&A 
in any of its instructions. 
The jury found defendants guilty on all counts.  These 
appeals followed. 
II.  DISCUSSION4 
Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting their convictions, asserting that the Government 
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that their statements 
were actually “false.”5  In doing so, they raise an issue of first 
impression in this Circuit as to the prosecution’s burden to 
prove that a statement was “false” in response to an ambiguous 
reporting requirement:  Must the prosecution prove the state-
ment false under each objectively reasonable interpretation of 
that reporting requirement, as Defendants argue and as several 
of our sister circuits require?  Or is it enough, as the Govern-
ment contends, for the prosecution to prove that a statement is 
false under one reasonable interpretation, as long as a defend-
ant accepted that interpretation at the time she made the state-
ment?  For the following reasons, we agree with Defendants 
that the former is the proper burden and join our sister circuits 
in holding that the prosecution must prove a statement false 
under each objectively reasonable interpretation of an 
 
4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231, and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.   
 
5 Defendants also argue that insufficient evidence sup-
ports the jury’s findings that they possessed the requisite sci-
enter.  Because we reverse on other grounds, we need not ad-
dress this argument with respect to Defendants’ false statement 
and certification convictions.  
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ambiguous reporting requirement.  We first address the Gov-
ernment’s burden to prove falsity in the face of an ambiguous 
reporting requirement and then, reviewing the evidence in light 
of this burden, conclude the evidence was insufficient to sup-
port Defendants’ convictions.  Because this is fatal to the false 
statement counts of the Indictment, we will reverse those con-
victions.  And because we conclude this error was not harm-
less, we will vacate Defendants’ remaining convictions and re-
mand for retrial on those counts.   
A. The Government’s Burden to Prove Falsity  
We begin with the Government’s burden to prove the 
falsity element of the charged offenses, a matter over which we 
exercise plenary review.  See United States v. Rodriguez, 342 
F.3d 296, 298 (3d Cir. 2003).  We address four issues: (1) the 
Government’s contention that we have previously decided this 
issue in its favor; (2) why a defendant’s subjective belief that a 
statement is false cannot satisfy the objective falsity element 
consistent with due process; (3) the proper burden of proof; and 
(4) whether reasonableness in this context is a question for the 
jury or the judge. 
1. The Government’s burden to prove falsity 
in the face of an ambiguous reporting re-
quirement is a matter of first impression in 
this Circuit. 
The Government argues, drawing on a line of cases 
dealing with “fundamental ambiguity” in the context of perjury 
and false statements under § 1001, that—short of a “fundamen-
tal” ambiguity—we have held ambiguity irrelevant to the ele-
ment of falsity.  That assertion misapprehends the development 
of our case law to date.   
In one line of cases, we have addressed the prosecu-
tion’s burden to prove falsity in the absence of ambiguity.  In 
run-of-the-mill cases where there is no dispute over the mean-
ing of the question or reporting requirement to which a defend-
ant responded, proving falsity is straightforward:  A statement 
is false if it is “untrue.”  United States v. Castro, 704 F.3d 125, 
139 (3d Cir. 2013).  And as a necessary corollary, a statement 
that is “literally true . . . is, by definition, not false.”  Id.   
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In another line of cases, we have discussed the effect of 
“fundamental ambiguity” on scienter.  In the context of perjury 
and false statement convictions, we have held that “if a ques-
tion is excessively vague or ‘fundamentally ambiguous,’ then 
the answer to such question may not, as a matter of law, form 
the basis of a perjury or false statements prosecution.”  United 
States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010, 1015 (3d Cir. 1987) (citations 
omitted), abrogated in other part by United States v. Wells, 519 
U.S. 482 (1997).  We have consistently framed this rule as one 
that screens out perjury and false statement charges for which 
a jury could never determine “which construction the defend-
ant placed on the question” and, consequently, whether that de-
fendant intended to give a false answer.6  Id.  And most re-
cently, in United States v. Hird, 913 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 2019), 
we reiterated that fundamental ambiguity requires a court to 
“disturb a jury’s determination” if “it is entirely unreasonable 
to expect that the defendant understood the question posed to 
him” and characterized our inquiry on appeal as looking to 
whether there was sufficient evidence that the defendant in-
tended to perjure because she “understood the question well 
enough to give an answer that he or she knew to be false.”  Id. 
at 346 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see id. 
at 349 (finding a question not fundamentally ambiguous be-
cause the evidence at trial “would give any reasonable fact 
finder more than enough basis to conclude that the witness 
 
6 We first adopted this rule, albeit without yet using the 
phrase “fundamentally ambiguous,” in United States v. Slawik, 
548 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1977), where we ordered dismissal of a 
perjury indictment because it was “premised . . . on questions 
that were deliberately artless and vague” and thus “it was en-
tirely unreasonable to expect that the defendant understood the 
questions posed to him.”  Id. at 86.  Even with this category of 
questions, however, the mere fact that a question was funda-
mentally ambiguous does not mean a statement made in answer 
can never be false.  The inquiry is necessarily fact-specific, 
ranging from adoptive admissions where the truth of the an-
swer depends entirely on the clarity of the question, to free-
standing or non-responsive statements included in the answer 




knew” the question had a certain meaning);7 see also United 
States v. Richardson, 421 F.3d 17, 33 (1st Cir. 2005) (“A ques-
tion that is truly ambiguous . . . can never provide a basis for a 
finding of perjury, as it could never be said that one intended 
to answer such a question untruthfully.” (citation omitted)).  
But these cases all discussed the effect of “fundamental ambi-
guity”—not just arguable ambiguity—and they did so in the 
context of the element of scienter, not falsity.8   
Neither line of cases resolved the effect of arguable am-
biguity on the issue we confront today: the Government’s bur-
den to prove falsity.  The closest we came before today was in 
United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2002).  There, the 
defendant was charged with fraudulently billing Medicare and 
Medicaid for ambulance services as if the vehicles had their 
“home station” in Pennsylvania when in fact the “home sta-
tions” were in other states.  Id. at 142.  Like Defendants here, 
 
7 We note that Hird’s application of the fundamental 
ambiguity standard on sufficiency of the evidence review, see 
913 F.3d at 346–47, is in some tension with our earlier funda-
mental ambiguity cases framing the standard as one to be ap-
plied when a defendant moves to dismiss an indictment, see, 
e.g., United States v. Serafini, 167 F.3d 812, 814, 820 (3d Cir. 
1999).  Because this tension concerns only the Government’s 
burden to prove scienter—an element of the offense not at is-
sue here—we leave its resolution for another day.  
 
8 We recognize that the distinction between questions 
considered typically or “arguably ambiguous” and those con-
sidered “fundamentally ambiguous” can be somewhat elusive, 
with the latter descriptor in some sense, conclusory.  Consistent 
with the use of these terms in the case law, however, the dif-
ference seems to be that an ambiguous question as typically 
understood is “open to more than one interpretation,” but it is 
also capable—by reference to context or other interpretative 
tools—of taking on one of them.  Ambiguous, Lexico.com, 
https://www.lexico.com/definition/ambiguous (2020).  In the 
case of “fundamental ambiguity,” on the other hand, there is 
no rational basis for making that choice.  For purposes of this 
opinion, we will use the term “arguably ambiguous” or simply 
“ambiguous” to refer to this type of question, as opposed to a 
“fundamentally ambiguous” question.   
16 
 
the Syme defendant challenged his false statement conviction 
on the ground that the term “home station” was not clearly de-
fined.  Id. at 142–43.  We agreed that there was some ambiguity 
as to the applicable definition of home station, but we did not 
reach the question of the prosecution’s burden to prove falsity 
in the face of an ambiguous reporting requirement.  Because 
the prosecution presented alternative theories of guilt on the 
relevant counts and the jury had returned a general verdict, we 
reasoned—pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Griffin 
v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991)—that the conviction could 
be reversed only if the “home station” theory of falsity was un-
constitutional or legally invalid.  Id. at 144.  Concluding that 
the indictment did not “rel[y] on erroneous interpretations of 
the law” and that the district court had properly instructed the 
jury, we affirmed under Griffin and declined to reach whether 
the “home station” theory of falsity was supported by sufficient 
evidence.  Id. at 146–48.   
In sum, the Government’s protestations to the contrary, 
we have not previously defined the Government’s burden of 
proof to establish falsity in the face of ambiguous reporting re-
quirements—much less resolved it in the Government’s favor.  
That is a question of first impression in our Circuit and the one 
to which we now turn. 
2. Due process demands that the falsity ele-
ment stand independent of a defendant’s 
subjective intent. 
Relying on Ryan and Hird, the Government argues that 
as long as a question is not fundamentally ambiguous, the Gov-
ernment’s burden as to falsity is simply to prove that a defend-
ant understood an ambiguous reporting requirement to mean 
what the Government says it means and, in light of that mean-
ing, intended to lie.  Oral Arg. Tr. 109:15–16 (emphasizing 
“the construction that a particular [d]efendant placed on the 
term ‘past due’”).  This argument fails not only because it mis-
takes the case law on which it relies as addressing falsity in-
stead of scienter but also, more fundamentally, because it col-
lapses subjective falsity—the defendant’s intent to lie—with 
objective falsity, i.e., the untruth of the statement in question.  
It thus runs up against the demands of due process: the prose-
cutor’s duty to prove every element of the offense.  
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It is a bedrock principle that “the [Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s] Due Process Clause protects the accused against con-
viction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every 
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 
charged.”  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); see also 
United States v. Nasir, 982 F.3d 144, 162 (3d Cir. 2020) (en 
banc).  Once the Government chooses to charge a particular 
offense, it undertakes the burden to “convince the trier of all 
the essential elements of guilt,” Winship, 297 U.S. at 361, and 
if the prosecution fails to carry this burden, a conviction cannot 
stand.  To allow otherwise would be to endorse conviction 
merely for “being bad”—an outcome abhorrent to the tenet 
that, in “our legal system,” we convict people only of “specific 
crimes.”  Castro, 704 F.3d at 140.  Indeed, we have repeatedly 
found that the prosecution’s failure to prove an element of an 
offense is sufficiently grave to amount to a “miscarriage of jus-
tice” and a basis to reverse a conviction even on plain error 
review.  See, e.g., Nasir, 982 F.3d at 174; United States v. Re-
tos, 25 F.3d 1220, 1231–32 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1287 (3d Cir. 1993).    
In the false statement context, because falsity and 
knowledge are distinct elements, this means the Government 
must prove a statement was false beyond a reasonable doubt, 
regardless of the defendant’s subjective intent to lie.  Castro, 
704 F.3d at 139.  If that were ever in question, any doubt was 
erased by our decision in United States v. Castro, where a de-
fendant who believed he was lying when he told a federal agent 
he received money from a particular person, but who in fact 
had made a “completely, if unintentionally, accurate” state-
ment because the money had actually come from an under-
cover agent, had been convicted of making a false statement 
under § 1001.  Id. at 131, 133, 139–40.  We reversed, holding 
that the defendant could not be convicted for making a false 
statement when his statement was literally true, even though he 
believed it was untrue.  Id.  Allowing a defendant’s subjective 
intent to stand in for “a complete failure of proof” on the falsity 
element, we explained, would collapse the two elements and 
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relieve the prosecution of its constitutional burden to prove 
each and every element of the offense.9  Id. at 139. 
Yet the Government here advances the selfsame argu-
ment as the prosecution in Castro: that the actual falsity of De-
fendants’ statements is “irrelevant,” Castro, 704 F.3d at 140, 
as long as the Government can establish that there was a meet-
ing of the minds between Defendants and their regulators on 
what constituted a “past due” loan and that Defendants in-
tended to report falsely in light of this mutually understood 
meaning.  Consistent with the Government’s burden to prove 
each and every element of an offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, we rejected this argument in Castro and do so again to-
day.  The Government must show not merely that a defendant 
subjectively intended to lie, but also that the statement in ques-
tion was objectively false.10 
3. Where a reporting requirement is ambig-
uous, the Government bears the burden of 
proving falsity under each objectively rea-
sonable interpretation of the requirement. 
Because we must define a standard for falsity independ-
ent of a defendant’s subjective intent, we now turn to defining 
the Government’s burden of proof where a reporting require-
ment is ambiguous.  Here, we are guided by another due 
 
9 Nor does the text of § 1001 support a subjective-belief 
exception to the Government’s burden to prove falsity.  Be-
cause “[k]nowledge and belief are very different mental states” 
and Congress, in enacting § 1001, chose to criminalize only 
knowledge, § 1001 cannot support the conviction of a defend-
ant who merely believes that his true statement is false.  Castro, 
704 F.3d. at 140 (citation omitted).   
 
10 As we recently put it in discussing the element of fal-
sity under the False Claims Act, a requirement of “factual evi-
dence that [the defendant] was making a knowingly false deter-
mination” in order to prove “factual” or “objective” falsity 
would “conflate[] the elements of scienter and falsity” and 
“read[] the scienter element out of the text of the statute.”  
United States v. Care Alternativeness, 952 F.3d 89, 96 (3d Cir. 
2020) (emphasis in original). 
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process principle: the requirement that potential defendants be 
given “fair warning” of what conduct could give rise to crimi-
nal liability.  
It is “[a] fundamental principle in our legal system . . . 
that laws which regulate persons or entities must give fair no-
tice of conduct that is forbidden or required.”  FCC v. Fox Tel-
evision Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012).  Thus, “a con-
viction . . . fails to comply with due process if the statute or 
regulation under which it is obtained ‘fails to provide a person 
of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is 
so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously dis-
criminatory enforcement.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. Wil-
liams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).  This fundamental tenet en-
sures that a “statute, either standing alone or as construed, 
made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that the defend-
ant’s conduct was criminal.”  United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 
259, 267 (1997).  Accordingly, as the Supreme Court explained 
in Lanier, “due process bars courts from applying a novel con-
struction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute 
nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within 
its scope.”11  Id. at 266. 
Fair warning principles apply with equal force when a 
defendant is criminally charged as a result of noncompliance 
with agency regulations or guidance.  See Fox Television Sta-
tions, 567 U.S. at 253 (explaining the “due process concern[]” 
that “regulated parties should know what is required of them 
so they may act accordingly”).  Thus, a conviction for conceal-
ing material facts in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1)—an-
other subsection of the statute under which Defendants were 
convicted for making false statements—cannot stand absent 
 
11 This is one of “three related manifestations of the fair 
warning requirement.”  Lanier, 520 U.S. at 266.  The other two 
manifestations are the vagueness doctrine, which “bars en-
forcement of ‘a statute which either forbids or requires the do-
ing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelli-
gence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application,’” id. (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)), and the rule of lenity, which “en-
sures fair warning by so resolving the ambiguity in a criminal 
statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered,” id.   
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fair notice of the legal duty to make the particular disclosure.  
See United States v. Safavian, 528 F.3d 957, 964–65 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (reversing a § 1001(a)(1) conviction because “vague” 
government guidance documents were insufficient to create a 
legal duty to disclose); United States v. White Eagle, 721 F.3d 
1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2013) (reversing a § 1001(a)(1) convic-
tion when the regulation purportedly creating a duty to disclose 
did not “provide specifics on what kind of information should 
be reported or to whom”).  Likewise, where neither the tax 
code, Treasury regulations, nor federal court cases create “a 
clear rule of law,” there has been no fair warning and a tax 
evasion conviction cannot stand.  United States v. Harris, 942 
F.2d 1125, 1131–32 (7th Cir. 1991); see also, e.g., Sanders v. 
Freeman, 221 F.3d 846, 852–53 (6th Cir. 2000); United States 
v. Pirro, 212 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Mal-
las, 762 F.2d 361, 364–65 (4th Cir. 1985).    
Even in the civil context, fair warning requires that gov-
ernment agencies communicate their interpretation of their 
own regulations with “ascertainable certainty” before subject-
ing private parties to punishment under that interpretation.  
FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 249, 251 
(3d Cir. 2015).  This is because it is difficult for a private party 
to predict how an agency will interpret an ambiguous statute or 
regulation.  Id. at 251–52.  Whereas “courts generally resolve 
statutory ambiguity by applying traditional methods of con-
struction” so that “[p]rivate parties can reliably predict the 
court’s interpretation by applying the same methods,” agencies 
are “often free to adopt any reasonable construction” and 
“may impose higher legal obligations than required by the best 
interpretation.”  Id. at 252.  As a result, “[i]t is harder to predict 
how an agency will construe a statute or regulation at some 
unspecified point in the future, particularly when that interpre-
tation will depend on the political views of the President in of-
fice at [that] time.”  Id. (second alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  And this is where due 
process steps in:  Against the backdrop of that unpredictability, 
an agency must have clearly communicated its policies before 
a private party may be sanctioned—much less criminally pros-
ecuted—for violating them. 
Applying these fair warning principles here, we hold 
that where falsity turns on how an agency has communicated 
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its reporting requirements to the entities it regulates and those 
communications are ambiguous, fair warning demands that the 
Government prove a defendant’s statement false under each 
objectively reasonable interpretation of the relevant require-
ments.12  This standard ensures that the requisite notice will be 
given to potential criminal defendants making required reports 
to their regulators, for an ambiguous reporting requirement—
one susceptible to an objectively reasonable interpretation un-
der which a defendant’s statement is true—does not “fairly dis-
close[],” Lanier, 520 U.S. at 266, to the defendant that her re-
sponse, because false under a different reasonable interpreta-
tion, could give rise to criminal liability.  That defendant can-
not know with “ascertainable certainty,” Wyndham, 799 F.3d 
at 251, whether her statement will be considered false.  If a 
regulator fails to give fair warning, it may still succeed in a 
false statement prosecution—but only if it proves either that its 
interpretation is the only reasonable one or that the defendant’s 
statement is false under each reasonable interpretation.       
With this holding, we join our many sister circuits that 
have reached similar conclusions.  See United States v. White-
side, 285 F.3d 1345, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002) (“In a case where 
the truth or falsity of a statement centers on an interpretive 
question of law, the government bears the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s statement is not 
true under a reasonable interpretation of the law.”); United 
States v. Prigmore, 243 F.3d 1, 17–18 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[T]here 
 
12 No doubt, under an objective standard, the determi-
nation here—as in other areas of the law that rely on an objec-
tive reasonableness standard—may take account of particular 
characteristics of the defendant by considering, for example, 
“what a reasonable person under the circumstances would be-
lieve or understand,” United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 
137 (3d Cir. 2012), “prevailing professional norms,” Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–89 (1984), and “the 
perspective of a reasonable [category of professional]” in the 
defendant’s situation, Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 450 
(3d Cir. 2017).  Assessing reasonableness from “the perspec-
tive of a reasonable person in [the defendant’s] position, con-
sidering ‘all the circumstances,’” Oncale v. Sundowner Off-
shore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998), however, is still an 
objective, not a subjective, inquiry.  
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has been no crime if the statements were not false . . . under an 
objectively reasonable interpretation of the law imposing the 
duty.”); United States v. Migliaccio, 34 F.3d 1517, 1525 (10th 
Cir. 1994) (“[T]he government bears the burden to negate any 
reasonable interpretations that would make a defendant’s state-
ment factually correct where reporting requirements are am-
biguous.”); United States v. Johnson, 937 F.2d 392, 399 (8th 
Cir. 1991) (“[T]he government must negative any reasonable 
interpretation that would make the defendant’s statement fac-
tually correct.”); cf. United States v. Jones, 664 F.3d 966, 977 
(5th Cir. 2011) (concluding that where defendants claim they 
“reasonably believed” their statements were legal, “the Gov-
ernment must show that [they] knew that their claims were 
false by proving [their] interpretation of the law was not rea-
sonable”).13 
Of course, by adopting this standard as to falsity, we do 
not suggest that the ambiguity of a reporting requirement or the 
reasonableness of an alternative interpretation is irrelevant to 
mens rea; to the contrary, a defendant may well argue she 
lacked scienter because she reasonably relied on an alternative 
interpretation.  But we do reject the Government’s positions 
that ambiguity is relevant exclusively to scienter and that the 
 
13 Two Courts of Appeals have suggested, in false state-
ment cases involving application forms, that as long as there is 
sufficient evidence that the Government and the defendant had 
the same meaning in mind, the prosecution has satisfied its bur-
den to prove falsity.  See United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 
401, 403, 408–09 (4th Cir. 2012) (involving the term “father” 
on a passport application); United States v. Camper, 384 F.3d 
1073, 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (involving a question about a 
firearm possession conviction on a security clearance applica-
tion).  But these cases do not grapple with falsity at all—only 
with scienter.  See Sarwari, 669 F.3d at 407 (explaining that 
the jury’s role is to “determine[] whether the defendant knew 
his statement was false”); Camper, 384 F.3d at 1076 (explain-
ing that the jury “decides which of the plausible interpretations 
of an ambiguous question the defendant apprehended and re-
sponded to”).  In any event, for the reasons we have explained, 
we reject that approach as collapsing falsity and scienter in 
contravention of due process.  
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decisions of our sister circuits support that proposition.  They 
do not.   
As our sister circuits have made clear and as fair warn-
ing demands, ambiguity is relevant to falsity in its own right.  
The Eleventh Circuit in Whiteside explicitly applied the stand-
ard we adopt today to hold that the government failed to 
“prove[e] the actus reus of the offense—actual falsity,” 285 
F.3d at 1353, and the Eighth Circuit has recognized for decades 
that “in carrying out [its] burden [to prove falsity], the govern-
ment must negative any reasonable interpretation that would 
make the defendant’s statement factually correct,” United 
States v. Anderson, 579 F.2d 455, 460 (8th Cir. 1978).  Alt-
hough the First and Tenth Circuits have articulated this stand-
ard primarily in the context of addressing requested jury in-
structions going to the knowledge element, both have also ex-
plicitly linked it to falsity.  See Prigmore, 243 F.3d at 17–18 
(relying on the general rule that a statement is not “fraudulent” 
if it is “not in fact false under an objectively reasonable inter-
pretation” of a reporting requirement (citing United States v. 
Rowe, 144 F.3d 15, 21–23 (1st Cir. 1998))); Migliaccio, 34 
F.3d at 1525 (observing, with respect to falsity, that “the Gov-
ernment bears the burden to negate any reasonable interpreta-
tions that would make a defendant’s statement factually correct 
where reporting requirements are ambiguous” (citing United 
States v. Anderson, 579 F.2d 455, 460 (8th Cir. 1978), and 
United States v. Race, 632 F.2d 1114, 1120 (4th Cir. 1980))).    
In sum, an ambiguous reporting requirement is not nec-
essarily fatal to a false statement conviction.  But to prove a 
statement in response to that requirement false, the Govern-
ment must prove either (a) that its interpretation is the only ob-
jectively reasonable interpretation and that, under this interpre-
tation, the defendant’s statement was false, or (b) that the de-
fendant’s statement was false under each alternative, objec-
tively reasonable interpretation.  Put another way, if the Gov-
ernment cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defend-
ant’s statement was false under each objectively reasonable in-
terpretation of an ambiguous reporting requirement, it cannot 
prove the element of falsity.         
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4. Reasonableness is for the jury, not the 
judge. 
When it comes to determining whether it has met its 
burden, the Government argues that reasonableness must be a 
question of law for the judge, not the jury, because “courts, not 
juries, must determine the scope of a [statutory or regulatory] 
provision.”  Appellee’s Br. 70 (quoting Obasi Inv. Ltd. v. Tibet 
Pharm., Inc., 931 F.3d 179, 188 (3d Cir. 2019)); see also Oral 
Arg. Tr. 81:4–18 (contending that the judge must construe re-
porting requirements as “legal concept[s]” and that the jury’s 
role is limited to “dispos[ing] of any genuine issues of material 
fact” based on those concepts).  We disagree.   
The question is not the legally correct interpretation of 
a requirement, but rather whether a reasonable person in the 
defendant’s position could interpret the reporting requirement 
only in the way urged by the Government or also in a way that 
would make the defendant’s responses true.14  Cf. Wyndham, 
799 F.3d at 252 (recognizing a difference between how an 
agency interprets ambiguous statutes and regulations and how 
a court might interpret those same sources).  And this type of 
reasonableness determination is one that juries routinely per-
form.  As the Supreme Court recently observed, “we have long 
recognized across a variety of doctrinal contexts that, when the 
relevant question is how an ordinary person or community 
would make an assessment, the jury is generally the deci-
sionmaker that ought to provide the fact-intensive answer.”  
Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 574 U.S. 418, 422 (2015); id. 
 
14 For that reason, the reasonableness inquiry goes be-
yond the purview of the judge to resolve “disputes regarding 
the meaning of federal statutes and federal regulations,” 
Bonkowski v. Oberg Indus., Inc., 787 F.3d 190, 203 (3d Cir. 
2015).  And because reasonableness is a question of fact, it 
does not require the jury to “constru[e]” highly technical “writ-
ten instruments,” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 
U.S. 370, 388 (1996).  The evidence here, for example, consists 
of two sets of written instructions to banks that, although dry, 
are written in relatively plain language and do not rely on any 




(collecting cases).15  That is no less true when the question is 
the “construction of an arguably ambiguous” question or re-
porting requirement.  Slawik, 548 F.2d at 86 (citation and in-
ternal quotation omitted).  
Of course, this does not mean that “ambiguous ques-
tioning [is] a safe conduct for perjury.”  Id.  It means merely 
that “when an answer would be true on one construction of an 
arguably ambiguous question but false on another,” id., the 
jury must decide whether the Government has satisfied its bur-
den to prove that its interpretation “is the only reasonable in-
terpretation,” id. at 85.  And the Government has a range of 
tools at its disposal to meet that burden:  In some cases, it may 
be sufficient to point the jury to the plain text of the relevant 
reporting requirement; in others, additional evidence may be 
required, e.g., expert testimony establishing that the purport-
edly ambiguous requirement involved terms of art well known 
to a reasonable person in the defendant’s field or could be rea-
sonably interpreted only as the Government argues in a given 
business context.  See, e.g., Syme, 276 F.3d at 143–44 (discuss-
ing testimony going to “a debate within the [relevant] commu-
nity” about the meaning of a disputed reporting requirement); 
Stawick, 548 F.2d at 85 (distinguishing questions involving 
ambiguous terms from those involving “terms of art” or “words 
of common currency” in a given context).  But if the 
 
15 See also Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, 895 F.3d 
303, 312–16 (3d Cir. 2018) (treating both whether an employer 
exercised reasonable care in detecting and eliminating sexual 
harassment and whether the employee acted reasonably in not 
availing herself of the employer’s anti-harassment opportuni-
ties as jury questions); Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 
506 (3d Cir. 2010) (treating whether a shift change was a rea-
sonable accommodation under the ADA as a jury question); 
Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 396 (3d Cir. 2010) (treat-
ing the objective reasonableness of a defendant’s belief that 
deadly force was necessary for self-defense as a jury question); 
Jaasma v. Shell Oil Co., 412 F.3d 501, 512 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(treating whether a lessor made reasonable efforts to mitigate 
damages following a lessee’s vacation of the premises as a 
question for the jury); Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 
198 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that “[t]he reasonableness of [a po-
lice officer’s] use of force is normally an issue for the jury”). 
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Government cannot persuade the jury that its interpretation is 
the only reasonable interpretation in the circumstances, then to 
prove falsity, it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant’s statement was false under both interpretations.  See 
Syme, 276 F.3d at 147 (holding that whether a disputed term in 
a false statements case had “a meaning” was a jury question); 
see also, e.g., United States v. Stacks, 821 F.3d 1038, 1043–44 
(8th Cir. 2016); Whiteside, 285 F.3d at 1352–53; Migliaccio, 
34 F.3d at 1525.   
This is not to say that there is no role for the judge.  To 
the contrary, the judge’s role in requiring the Government to 
meet its burden of proof is substantial.  At the outset of a trial, 
the judge must determine, as a preliminary question under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 104, whether a reporting requirement is 
ambiguous—and, accordingly, the extent to which she will al-
low evidence and argument on the existence of an objectively 
reasonable interpretation under which a defendant’s statement 
is true.  If the judge determines that “administrative authority 
clearly answer[s] the dilemma the defendants faced,” White-
side, 285 F.3d at 1353–54, she might limit the introduction of 
evidence concerning ambiguity to purposes other than objec-
tive falsity.  If she determines the question of ambiguity should 
reach the jury, she may be more receptive to admitting evi-
dence on that subject, e.g., evidence of commonly known in-
dustry practices or terms of the trade.  And in the latter case, 
she performs another essential check at the conclusion of the 
prosecution’s case by assessing whether the Government has 
introduced sufficient evidence of falsity under each reasonable 
interpretation of the reporting requirement to survive a Rule 29 
motion.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a).   
 It is also incumbent on the judge, in the context of am-
biguous reporting requirements, to provide the proper jury in-
structions on the Government’s burden of proof with respect to 
falsity.  These instructions mirror the instructions requested 
here and those included in the model jury instructions of many 
of our sister circuits, which require the jury to find whether “a 
particular question was ambiguous and the defendant truthfully 
answered one reasonable interpretation of the question” and 
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instruct the jury that, if so, that “answer would not be false.”16  
See Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal § 2.69 
(2019); Tenth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal § 2.66 
(2018); Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 
§ O64 (2020); see also Modern Federal Jury Instructions: 
Criminal ¶ 36.01[3] instruction 36-12 (2020) (including the 
same instruction for § 1001 offenses).   
 In sum, while the judge retains an essential role in a 
false statement trial involving an ambiguous reporting require-
ment, the question of the reasonableness of a proffered inter-
pretation of that requirement is for the jury.  
B. Whether the Government Met Its Burden to 
Prove Falsity  
Having defined the Government’s burden to prove fal-
sity, we now consider whether it carried that burden by intro-
ducing sufficient evidence at trial.  When a defendant chal-
lenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her convic-
tion, we “examine the totality of the evidence . . . in the light 
most favorable to the government,” United States v. Starnes, 
583 F.3d 196, 206 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted), and “ask 
whether [the evidence] is strong enough for a rational trier of 
fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” United States v. 
Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013).   
In view of what we have recognized today as the Gov-
ernment’s burden of proof, we consider (1) whether the re-
quirement to report “past due” loans was ambiguous, and, if so, 
(2) whether the Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Defendants’ reports of “past due” loans were false under 
each reasonable interpretation. 
 
16 While we note that Defendants’ requested instruction 
was a correct statement of the law, United States v. Davis, 183 
F.3d 231, 250 (3d Cir. 1999), we need not reach whether any 
instructional error was harmless with respect to the false state-
ment counts, see United States v. Korey, 472 F.3d 89, 96 (3d 
Cir. 2007), because we resolve this appeal on other grounds.   
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1. The relevant reporting requirements were 
ambiguous. 
We agree with Defendants that, particularly given the 
OTS Q&A, both the SEC instructions and the call report in-
structions are ambiguous with respect to the “precise question 
at issue,” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984):  whether mature loans with un-
paid principals that were current for interest and in the process 
of being extended were to be reported as “past due.”17   
Begin with the SEC instructions, which directed the 
Bank to identify “[a]ccruing loans which are contractually past 
due 90 days or more as to principal or interest pay-
ments.”  A9219 (emphasis added).  No further definition is 
given.  Yet the Government—relying on what it characterizes 
as the “ordinary meaning” of past due—argues that the SEC 
instructions unambiguously require that “a borrower’s failure 
to repay principal upon maturity . . . must be reported as past 
due.”  Appellee’s Br. 53.      
The Government’s interpretation ignores the role of the 
word “contractually,” which indicates that whether a loan is 
“past due” is determined by the terms of that particular loan’s 
contract, not by any general meaning of “past due.”  And 
 
17 While each agency’s instructions were arguably am-
biguous standing alone, that ambiguity was undoubtedly com-
pounded by consideration of those instructions together and in 
relation to the OTS Q&A.  We observe that where a defendant 
is instructed to make nearly identical reports to multiple agen-
cies that assign different meanings to substantially similar 
terms, we may—at least in the absence of clear and precise 
guidance by the particular agency whose instructions are at is-
sue—consider those other instructions in determining both am-
biguity and reasonableness.  See Whiteside, 285 F.3d at 1352 
(looking to regulations, administrative rulings, and judicial de-
cisions to determine that there was no clear definition of a re-
porting requirement); United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 
1288 (11th Cir. 2009) (consulting state and federal regulations 
to identify ambiguity where the falsity of defendant’s state-




looking to the contracts here does not answer the question, but 
rather confirms that “reasonable people [can] differ,” White-
side, 285 F.3d at 1352–53, as to whether the waived loans were 
“contractually past due.”  After all, the Bank’s contracts pro-
vide that failure to pay the principal at maturity would consti-
tute a default—suggesting that mature loans with unpaid prin-
cipals would be “contractually past due.”  But they also pre-
serve the Banks’s right to “renew or extend (repeatedly and for 
any length of time) th[e] loan . . . without the consent of or no-
tice to anyone,” A11756—giving the Bank a contractual right 
to, of its own accord, determine that a payment due under the 
contract is not due at all.  Where, as here, the Bank exercised 
this right—by making arrangements with borrowers to “waive” 
the loan—whether the principal payment remained “contractu-
ally past due” is ambiguous to say the least. 
The call report instructions too are ambiguous.  To 
begin with, they track the language of the SEC instructions, 
stating that “[t]he past due status of a loan . . . [is] determined 
in accordance with its contractual repayment terms.”  A9622.  
They then attempt to clarify this ambiguity by addressing the 
“circumstances” in which loans “are to be reported as past due 
when either interest or principal is unpaid,” including: 
(3) Single payment and demand notes, debt se-
curities, and other assets providing for the pay-
ment of interest at stated intervals are to be re-
ported as past due after one interest payment is 
due and unpaid for 30 days or more. 
(4) Single payment notes, debt securities, and 
other assets providing for the payment of interest 
at maturity are to be reported as past due after 
maturity if interest or principal remains unpaid 
for 30 days or more. 
A9622–23.  Yet neither of these circumstances clearly applies 
to loans—like those at issue here—that require interest to be 
paid both at regular intervals and at maturity.  See A11755 
(providing for the payment of both regular monthly payments 
and the payment of “all accrued unpaid interest” upon ma-
turity).  If Circumstance Three loans are required to be reported 
only when interest is unpaid for 30 days and Circumstance 
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Four loans are required to be reported when interest or the prin-
cipal is unpaid 30 days, when should a loan that requires both 
interest to be regularly paid and interest to be paid at maturity 
be reported as past due?  The call report instructions give no 
“clear[] answer,” Whiteside, 285 F.3d at 1352–53.  
The Government’s attempts to dispel this internal in-
consistency in the call report instructions are unavailing.  First, 
the Government argues that Circumstance Four unambigu-
ously applies to the waived loans because the loan agreements 
“required borrowers to continue making interest payments at 
and beyond maturity.”  Appellee’s Br. 58.  True enough, but 
by its plain language, Circumstance Three also applies to such 
a loan.  The Government next argues that only Circumstance 
Four applies to “matured loans.”  Id. at 54.  But this reads a 
distinction between Circumstances Three and Four that is ab-
sent from the text, as nowhere do the call report instructions 
suggest that Circumstance Three applies only to loans before 
maturity and that, once a loan matures, Circumstance Four 
governs.   
The Government goes on to fault Defendants for ignor-
ing the definition of “nonaccrual” loan status in a different sec-
tion of the call report instructions as applying when either the 
principal or interest is unpaid.  A9623.  Yet this only under-
mines the Government’s point: “Past due” and “nonaccrual” 
are distinct terms of art, and the call report instruction’s use of 
specific language in the “nonaccrual” definition suggests that 
this language was intentionally excluded from the “past due” 
definition.   
As this discussion makes clear, the Government’s reli-
ance on the phrase “contractually past due” does not eliminate 
any ambiguity with respect to the types of loans at issue in this 
case.  
2. The Government failed to prove that De-
fendants’ interpretation of the relevant re-
porting requirements was unreasonable. 
In light of this ambiguity, the Government bore the bur-
den of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that either the alter-
native interpretation was unreasonable or that Defendants’ 
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statements were false even under that alternative and reasona-
ble interpretation.  The Government concedes that the state-
ments were not false under the interpretation Defendants have 
put forward and, given the record before us, no reasonable jury 
could conclude that their alternative interpretation was objec-
tively unreasonable.  To the contrary, with respect to the SEC 
instructions, it is quite plausible—given the terms of the loan 
agreements here—that the phrase “contractually past due” 
would exclude a mature loan that is treated as “waived” and 
that is in the process of being extended, even when no notice 
has been given the borrower.  And, critically, other than relying 
on the purported “ordinary meaning” of “contractually past 
due,” the Government offers no evidence that this interpreta-
tion is unreasonable—which it must in order to meet its burden 
to prove falsity.18   
Turning to the call report instructions, the Government 
faces an even steeper climb.  Defendants point out, quite logi-
cally, that Circumstances Three and Four can be reconciled by 
reading Circumstance Three as applying to loans that require 
interest payments pre-maturity and Circumstance Four as gov-
erning loans that require no interest payments until maturity 
(such as lump-sum “bullet” loans).  And the OTS Q&A repre-
sented the position of another regulatory agency interpreting a 
nearly identically worded provision to mean that a loan that has 
been “informal[ly] exten[ded] . . . when the bank has agreed to 
accept interest payments until the property is rented or sold” is 
not “past due.”19  A12509.  This is perfectly logical.  Accord 
 
18 Had the Government, for example, offered evidence 
that “contractually past due” was an industry term of art with a 
widely accepted meaning, it may have been able to convince a 
jury that the alternative interpretation was unreasonable.  See, 
e.g., Syme, 276 F.3d at 143–44.  But in the absence of any such 
evidence, there was insufficient evidence from which a jury 
could conclude that the Government’s interpretation is the only 
reasonable reading of the reporting requirement. 
 
19 Defendants challenge the exclusion of this evidence 
as to falsity on appeal.  Because we find the convictions unsup-
ported by sufficient evidence regardless, we need not reach 
whether limiting that evidence was an abuse of discretion.  But 
we note that in future cases, another agency’s interpretation of 
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Whiteside, 285 F.3d at 1352 (finding the defendants’ interpre-
tation reasonable where it “comport[ed] with [a] logical no-
tion”).  The Government, on the other hand, contends that only 
Circumstance Four applies to matured loans—even those gov-
erned by Circumstance Three before maturity—which renders 
Circumstance Three in large part redundant.  But even assum-
ing that interpretation is also reasonable, the Government has 
not put forth evidence from which the jury could find that this 
was the only reasonable interpretation.  
In sum, the Government has failed to prove that its view 
of either the SEC or the Fed requirements is the only reasona-
ble interpretation.  Under these circumstances, it could prove 
falsity only by establishing that Defendants’ statements were 
false under each reasonable interpretation.  As the Government 
conceded at oral argument, however, it cannot do so, which is 
fatal to Counts Four through Nineteen.  Because these counts 
require proof of falsity as an essential element and the Govern-
ment cannot meet its burden of proof as to that element, we 
will reverse Defendants’ convictions on these counts. 
C. The Remaining Securities Fraud Counts 
Having addressed the convictions that rested on the al-
leged Waiver Practice scheme, we now turn to Defendants’ 
convictions for Counts One (conspiracy) and Two (securities 
fraud).  The Government argues these convictions can be sal-
vaged because they also rested on a second theory of liability: 
the Bank’s short-term extension en masse of loans approaching 
maturity, which the Government describes as a “mass-exten-
sion” or “‘extend and pretend’ scheme [linked] to the capital 
raise as an independent basis of guilt for the conspiracy and 
securities fraud offenses.”  Appellee’s Br. 147, 148 n.45.  The 
success of that argument, however, depends on: (1) whether 
the Government’s invocation of the “extend and pretend” the-
ory constructively amended the Indictment; (2) whether the 
Government presented sufficient evidence to support that the-
ory; and (3) whether the erroneous jury instructions concerning 
 
a parallel reporting requirement may be relevant to the reason-
ableness of a defendant’s interpretation.   
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the falsity theory were harmless as to the alternate mass-exten-
sion theory.  We consider these questions below. 
1. The Indictment was not constructively 
amended. 
An indictment is facially sufficient when it not only 
states the elements of the offense, but also “sufficiently ap-
prises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and 
. . . allows the defendant to show with accuracy to what extent 
he may plead a former acquittal or conviction in the event of a 
subsequent prosecution.”  United States v. Stevenson, 832 F.3d 
412, 423 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 
7(c)(1) (“The indictment . . . must be a plain, concise, and def-
inite written statement of the essential facts constituting the of-
fense charged.”).  It is constructively amended, however, when 
it fails to provide that fair notice because the trial “broaden[s] 
the possible bases for conviction from that which appeared in 
the indictment.”  United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 229 
(3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).  According to Defendants, 
that is precisely what happened here: the mass-extension the-
ory “first surfaced” at trial, and the only theory of liability iden-
tified in the Indictment relied on the “entirely different” 
Waiver Practice.  North Br. 49, 52. 
We disagree.  Although the overriding focus of the In-
dictment is undoubtedly the Waiver Practice, both the facts of 
the mass-extension procedure and the fraud it allegedly fur-
thered were introduced in the Indictment.20  Under the heading 
of “the Mass Extension Process,” the Indictment alleged that 
Defendants “embarked on a plan to mass-extend, through 
 
20 The Government also urges us to look to the Bill of 
Particulars as further evidence that the short-term extensions 
were charged as a basis of liability for securities fraud (Count 
Two) and the conspiracy to commit it (Count One).  We are 
skeptical that the Bill, which upon inspection says absolutely 
nothing about the mass extensions, would apprise the Defend-
ants of the need to meet charges related to anything other than 
the Waiver Practice.  However, we need not resolve the impact 
of the Bill of Particulars because we conclude that the Indict-
ment, standing alone, sufficiently alleged the extensions as an 
independent theory of liability. 
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short-term extensions,” loans that would otherwise come due 
at the end of 2009.  A224–25.  It also described how both the 
Waiver Practice and the mass extensions went undisclosed in 
the Bank’s 2009 Form 10-K filing, how the 10-K was incorpo-
rated into the Bank’s subsequent stock offering and attendant 
capital raise, and how Defendants did not inform the Fed about 
either the Waiver Practice or the mass extensions. 
Defendants counter that these allegations were still in-
sufficient to “inform [Defendants] of the specific offense . . . 
with which [Defendants were] charged,” Russell v. United 
States, 369 U.S. 749, 765 (1962) (citation omitted), because 
they appear only in the Indictment’s “Introduction,” A210, and 
not in the text of Counts One and Two.  But Count One specif-
ically identifies false certifications in the 2009 Form 10-K as a 
result of “significant issues with the . . . proper extension” of 
matured loans as an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, 
A234, and each of the Counts expressly incorporates the intro-
ductory allegations.  Granted, incorporating each and every 
paragraph of a lengthy introduction may not be the best way to 
give a defendant notice and may, as here, invite legal chal-
lenge.  Nevertheless, “incorporat[ion] by reference” is permit-
ted under the rules, Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1), and notice need 
not be ideal, only fair, as it was in this case:  Although the In-
dictment did not expressly label the mass-extension scheme an 
alternative basis for liability, no such label was required be-
cause the Indictment “makes it sufficiently clear that [the] 
counts alleged the . . . theory.”  Syme, 276 F.3d at 151 (uphold-
ing an indictment that identified an alternate theory by only a 
two-letter abbreviation in a summary chart); see also Steven-
son, 832 F.3d at 425 (noting that the only limitation on incor-
poration by reference is the requirement that it be “expressly 
done” (citation omitted)); United States v. Vanderpool, 528 
F.2d 1205, 1206–07 (4th Cir 1975) (approving incorporation 
of introductory allegations by reference); United States v. 
McGuire, 381 F.2d 306, 319 (2d Cir. 1967) (permitting the use 
of introductory paragraphs that “specifically referr[ed] to the 
counts involved”). 
Because the Indictment made sufficiently clear that 
there were two bases for the conspiracy and securities fraud 
charges—the Waiver Practice on the one hand, and the mass-
extension scheme on the other—the trial evidence and 
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argument concerning the extensions did not constitute a con-
structive amendment. 
2. The mass-extension evidence was suffi-
cient. 
Defendants argue that, even if the securities fraud and 
conspiracy counts were properly charged, the evidence at trial 
was insufficient to establish the requisite scienter: intent to de-
fraud.21  See 18 U.S.C. § 1348; United States v. Mahaffy, 693 
F.3d 113, 125 (2d Cir. 2012).  We review a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence by examining the totality of the ev-
idence “in the light most favorable to the government,” 
Starnes, 583 F.3d at 206 (citation omitted), and determining if 
that totality was sufficient for a rational jury to find the essen-
tial elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, Cara-
ballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 430.   
While the evidence limited to mass extensions is indeed 
thin, we cannot say, viewing the record in the light most favor-
able to the Government, that no rational jury could have found 
the essential elements of conspiracy to commit securities fraud 
and securities fraud beyond a reasonable doubt.  That evidence 
reflected that there was pressure to address mounting loans 
coming due in late 2009, that Bank executives (including De-
fendant North) scheduled a meeting in October 2009 to discuss 
“eliminat[ing] matured loans by” the end of the year, A10992, 
that extensions in the ordinary course of business would re-
quire full and time-consuming underwriting, and that, contrary 
to ordinary practice and Bank policy, hundreds of millions of 
dollars in soon-to-mature loans were extended on a short-term 
 
21 The securities fraud statute Defendants were con-
victed of violating, 18 U.S.C. § 1348, was only enacted in 2002 
as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and we have yet to address 
its scienter requirement.  Because our sister circuits are in 
agreement that § 1348 requires proof of intent to defraud, see 
United States v. Hussain, 972 F.3d 1138, 1146 (9th Cir. 2020); 
United States v. Coscia, 866 F.3d 782, 796 (7th Cir. 2017); 
Mahaffy, 693 F.3d at 125, and Defendants do not challenge that 
requirement (only the sufficiency of the proof to make it out), 




basis at the end of 2009 after only a “superficial review.”  
A5761.  In addition, the evidence showed that all Defendants 
were included on communications discussing these late 2009 
extensions, that the effect of extending the maturity dates of 
these loans past the first quarter of 2010 was to render them 
current for purposes of reporting requirements at the 2009 
year-end, that Defendants were involved in the creation of of-
fering documents describing the Bank’s financial health in 
connection with its February 2010 capital raise, and that those 
documents—which did not reflect the loans that would have 
matured but for the mass extensions—told prospective inves-
tors the Bank’s past-due loan liability was even lower at the 
end of 2009 than the prior year.   
Considering the totality of this evidence, a rational juror 
could conclude that Defendants had knowingly caused matur-
ing loans to be extended in order to push them off the books 
for 2009 and conceal the poor financial health of the Bank from 
investors, and that they had knowingly joined an agreement to 
do so.22  See United States v. Williams, 974 F.3d 320, 370 (3d 
Cir. 2020) (“The Government may prove the existence of a 
conspiracy entirely through circumstantial evidence.” (citation 
omitted)).  We therefore reject Defendants’ sufficiency chal-
lenges to Counts One and Two. 
3. The falsity error was not harmless. 
Although we are persuaded that the Government 
charged and adduced sufficient evidence to support a mass-
 
22 Gibson separately argues that there was insufficient 
evidence that he joined a conspiratorial agreement.  But the ev-
idence showed that Gibson signed the 2009 Form 10-K and 
certified both the accuracy of its representations and the ade-
quacy of the Bank’s internal controls, that he was included in 
communications discussing the mass extensions, and that the 
Form 10-K he signed nevertheless asserted that the Bank’s 
past-due loan liability decreased from the end of 2008 to the 
end of 2009.  Viewing the totality of the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Government, a rational juror could con-
clude that Gibson knowingly joined a conspiracy to defraud 
investors through the 2009 Form 10-K.  Accordingly, we also 
reject Gibson’s individual sufficiency challenge. 
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extension theory of liability, that does not end our analysis be-
cause Counts One and Two were also premised on the Waiver 
Practice theory, and where a conviction is supported by two 
independent theories, one of which is legally invalid, we must 
review the instructions for harmless error.  See Skilling v. 
United States, 561 U.S. 358, 414 (2010); Syme, 276 F.3d at 
144–45 (citing Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 56 (1991).  
Specifically, “[w]e presume that such errors are not harmless 
unless it can be ‘prove[d] beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict ob-
tained.’”  United States v. Wright, 665 F.3d 560, 570–71 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 
(1967) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)) (second 
alteration in original).  And that presumption is particularly dif-
ficult to overcome where “the government relies heavily on the 
improper theory, and the district court’s instructions on the im-
proper theory are ‘interwoven’ throughout the jury charge.”  
United States v. Andrews, 681 F.3d 509, 522 (3d Cir. 2012).   
The presumption is not overcome in this case.  Although 
the Government maintains that it “scrupulously introduced ev-
idence regarding each of [the] charged offenses” and carefully 
distinguished the extensions from the Waiver Practice as “an 
independent basis of guilt,”23 Appellee’s Br. 146–47, the trial 
record reflects that it repeatedly linked the Waiver Practice, 
mass extensions, and false statements together.  In its opening, 
for instance, the Government asserted that “defendants 
switched their scheme” from waiving past due loans to “ex-
tend[ing] them on a short-term basis” with “the end result 
 
23 The Government concedes on appeal that the false 
statement counts relied only on the Wavier Practice.  There is 
little in the record, however, to assuage our doubt that this dis-
tinction was clear to the jury.  In particular, a number of the 
false statement counts related to statements made in the 2009 
Form 10-K.  It is unclear why the mass-extension theory could 
not support these counts as well; after all, the Government ac-
cused the Bank of hiding its past-due liability by, among other 
things, extending loans en masse without disclosing the prac-
tice in the Form 10-K.  The Government’s concession on this 
point is binding, but the possibility that the extensions could 
have supported at least some of the false statement counts fur-
ther illustrates why the falsity error cannot be held harmless. 
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[being] the same,” A2476, and that “there[ was] no carveout, 
no exception for [the short-term extensions] in the call report 
instruction,” A2478.  When the District Court asked the pros-
ecutors to explain their position as to whether the mass exten-
sion of loans “didn’t make them not past due,” the Government 
responded that “the mass extension process was essentially a 
scheme to take what otherwise would have been reportable and 
reported as past due loans . . . and wiped them off reporting 
without having to deal with the waiver practice.”  A12631–32.  
And in its summation, it described the mass-extension process 
as the outgrowth of “the waived loans bec[o]m[ing] over-
whelming,” A7741, even going so far as to tell the jury that 
“mass extensions are basically just a new version of the waiver 
practice,” A7746.  In short, the Government not only relied 
heavily at trial on the legally erroneous Waiver Practice theory; 
it also failed to distinguish the evidence concerning that theory 
of fraud and the mass-extension scheme in its arguments before 
the District Court and the jury.  As such, we cannot say with 
confidence that the erroneous instruction as to falsity did not 
“contribute to the [jury’s] verdict.”  Wright, 665 F.3d 560, 570 
(citation omitted). 
The District Court’s other instructions raise additional 
doubts.  For instance, its instructions on Count Two (the secu-
rities fraud offense that also underlies Count One’s conspiracy 
charge) are rife with references to the falsity of Defendants’ 
representations about past due loans:  They informed the jury 
that the “scheme to defraud” involved “false or fraudulent . . . 
representations” that were “contained in [the Bank’s] SEC 
Form 10-K for 2009,” A8354, defined the materiality of the 
statements at issue in Count Two by reference to “the alleged 
false statements regarding past due loans,” A8359, and specif-
ically enumerated the statements regarding past due loans in 
the 2009 Form 10-K that the Government contended were 
false, see A8363.  And the jury here was given only a general 
unanimity instruction, not the specific instruction that might 
have avoided “a composite theory of guilt, producing twelve 
jurors who unanimously thought the defendant was guilty but 
who were not unanimous in their assessment of which act 
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supported the verdict.”24  United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 
462 (3d Cir. 1987).   
In sum, where, as here, we confront “a trial environment 
that emphasized the [legally erroneous] theory,” Wright, 665 
F.3d at 572, and jury instructions where “the improper theory 
[was] ‘interwoven’ throughout the . . . charge,” Andrews, 681 
F.3d at 522, the presumption that this error was not harmless 
controls.  Accordingly, we will vacate Defendants’ convictions 
on Counts One and Two and remand for a new trial limited to 
the mass-extension theory of fraud.25  See Syme, 276 F.3d at 
144–45. 
*          *          * 
For these reasons, we will reverse Defendants’ false 
statement and certification convictions, remanding on those 
counts for the entry of judgments of acquittal, and we will va-
cate Defendants’ convictions for conspiracy and securities 
fraud, remanding on those counts for a new trial.  
 
24 Ordinarily, a general unanimity instruction will suf-
fice to “ensure that the jury is unanimous on the factual basis 
for a conviction, even where an indictment alleges numerous 
factual bases for criminal liability.”  United States v. Gonzalez, 
905 F.3d 165, 184 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  However, we have long recognized an ex-
ception to this rule and the propriety of specific instructions 
“where the complexity of the case, or other factors, creates the 
potential that the jury will be confused.”  United States v. 
Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
25 Defendants also challenge their convictions on 
Counts One and Two on the basis of an alleged prejudicial var-
iance and cumulative error.  As we vacate and remand in any 
event, we need not address those arguments. 
